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Abstract 
This study analyzes the effect of the 2008 financial crisis on the venture capital market. We show 
that the crisis is associated with a decrease in the number of initial funding rounds as well as with a 
decrease in the amount of funds raised in later funding rounds. The effects of the crisis differed 
across industries and were stronger in the US than in other countries. We suggest that the crisis has 
led to a severe ‘funding gap’ in the financing of technological development and innovation. 
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Venture capital and the financial crisis: 
an empirical study across industries and countries 
 
I. Introduction 
The years 2007 through 2009 will be known for a financial crisis (hereafter, crisis) regarded 
as one of the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s (Almunia et al., 2009; Sinn, 2009). The 
crisis contributed to the failure of many well-known companies, led to a substantial decline in 
consumer wealth, produced enormous financial commitments incurred by governments, and 
resulted in a strong decline in economic activity. The crisis became visible to everyone with the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the near-bankruptcy of American International Group (AIG) in 
September 2008. Following these events, many other financial institutions in the US and around the 
world became affected and lost large portions of their value. Some of them could only be saved 
from bankruptcy by government interventions. 
This chapter deals with the effects of the crisis on the venture capital (hereafter, VC) market. 
Due to the strong links between the VC market and the financial markets in general, we expect a 
severe impact of the crisis on the VC market. VC is a very important source of funding for start-ups 
in innovative industries. VC is particularly important in the early phases of a firm’s life, when it 
starts to develop innovative products and to commercialize its innovations (Gompers and Lerner, 
2001; Jell et al., 2009; Zider, 1998). In this start-up phase, a firm does not have many other institu-
tions to turn to raise money. VC fills a void here. The inherent risks of a start-up in that phase are 
generally not accepted by banks (Bruns and Fletcher, 2008). To avoid risks, banks often require 
tangible assets, which are usually not available with young, innovative firms. The stock market and 
public equity are also not accessible at this stage, as the size of the firm is still too small for an IPO 
to be considered. Consequently, if the crisis has led to a strong decrease in VC activity, a funding 
gap in the financing of technological development and innovation may have occurred or may 
continue to occur. This in turn may have negative effects on subsequent economic development and 
growth. Prior research has shown VC funding to have a strong positive impact on firm growth, 
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technological development, and the evolution of industries (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001; Bottazzi 
et al., 2002; Florida and Kenney, 1988; Keuschnigg, 2004; Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Timmons and 
Bygrave, 1986). For example, Kortum and Lerner (2000) find that an increase in an industry’s VC 
activity leads to higher patent activity. It is estimated that VC is responsible for about 10% of US 
industrial innovation. Thus, if VC activity decreases – and patent application volumes with it – 
adverse long-term effects on the economy may occur. 
 
B. The questions explored in this study 
Except for Block and Sandner (2009), there is little empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
a financial crisis on VC activity. This study aims to shed more light on this issue. The following 
questions will be explored empirically: 
1. Is the crisis associated with a reduction in the total volume of VC funds invested? Is 
there a strong decrease in the number of VC deals? Had the crisis already had an im-
pact on VC activity before September 2008 (the month in which the historical event 
of the Lehman Brothers crash occurred)? 
2. Did the crisis lead to a reduction in the amount of funds raised per funding round? If 
so, what was the size of this decrease? 
3. Concerning the effects of the crisis, is there a difference between early- and later-
stage financing? 
4. How do the effects of the crisis on VC compare across industries and countries (US 
vs. non-US)? 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section II describes the causes of the cri-
sis and presents a timeline of the events associated with it. Section III summarizes the arguments for 
why the crisis may have affected the VC market. Section IV presents the empirical study, which is 
then discussed in Section V. Section VI discusses implications for start-ups and policy-makers and 
gives an outlook on further research. 
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II. The crisis: its causes and events 
This section summarizes the causes of the crisis and provides an overview of the events asso-
ciated with it. Many causes of the crisis have recently been proposed. The weight differs according 
to the expert questioned. We focus on three prominent explanations: the US housing bubble, the 
subprime crisis, and the deregulation of the financial markets in recent decades and the consequent 
creation of many complex financial innovations. 
• US housing bubble: The years prior to the outbreak of the crisis were characterized by 
a strong increase in US housing prices. This housing bubble was related to increasing 
financial incentives for banks to engage in mortgage loans. The decrease in the federal 
funds rate from the year 2000 onwards coincided with larger profit margins for banks 
on mortgages. As a result, housing prices peaked in 2006; their value had roughly 
doubled over the preceding decade. This boom period in the housing market was most 
importantly characterized by a strong increase in the amount of high-risk or subprime 
mortgages, which are provided to borrowers with relatively low credit ratings. 
• Subprime crisis: Between 2004 and 2007, the federal funds rate started to steadily in-
crease again, rising from a one-percent level in 2004. This trend brought increasing 
expenses for borrowers holding adjustable-rate mortgages. The combination of an in-
creasing federal funds rate with the growing share of (adjustable rate) subprime mort-
gages led to a severe increase in the number of homeowners defaulting on mortgage 
payments as well an increase in the number of foreclosures on properties. In August 
2007, the first hedge funds crashed (e.g., Bear Stearns), holding large shares of mort-
gage derivatives. Lending behavior among banks also became affected by the sub-
prime crisis. Increasing insecurity with regard to the credibility of other institutions 
made banks more reluctant to lend, leading to a tightening of their lending require-
ments. 
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• Deregulation and complex financial innovations: Government regulations did not pre-
vent banks from providing larger shares of subprime mortgages. Rather, in 2004, the 
loosening of the net capital rule made banks able to take on larger proportions of debt. 
Additionally, the increasing importance of the shadow banking system as a driving 
economic force fell under different governmental regulations, allowing for larger debt 
ratios. The increasing share of subprime mortgages was pooled and bundled into new 
financial products, selling them off to investors as CDOs (collateralized debt obliga-
tion) and MBS (mortgage-backed securities). The relatively safe credit ratings of these 
products contributed to an increasing demand of investors for mortgage-based deriva-
tives. 
Many events are associated with the crisis. To see the historical development and to under-
stand the decisions that we made to produce our empirical results, we provide the following over-
view (see also Orlowski, 2008). 
• August 2007: Outbreak of subprime crisis (bankruptcy of Bear Stearns’ in-house hedge 
fund). 
• December 2007: Impact of subprime crisis starts to affect other asset areas. Aside from 
mortgage banks, a large number of financial institutions are affected. 
• March 2008: Run on Bear Stearns, resulting from a period of increasing liquidity problems 
for banks. 
• January 2008 to July 2008: With the decreasing value of CDOs, money begins shifting to-
ward commodities. The commodity bubble reached its peak in July 2008.  
• September 2008: Increasing liquidity problems result in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
and the governmental takeover of AIG, which suffered from downgraded credit ratings. 
Along with the credit freeze, this led to a strong downturn in stock prices. 
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III. Arguments for why the crisis may have affected the VC market 
There exist several arguments for why the crisis may have had an effect on VC activity. The 
arguments can be grouped into two broad categories: 
Decrease in the supply of money to VC funds: Due to the crisis, VC funds (operated by VC 
firms) had difficulties in finding investors. Investors in VC funds are typically pension funds, 
insurance companies, and large banks (Gompers and Lerner, 1998). Many of these institutions were 
themselves adversely affected by the crisis. Some of them went bankrupt (e.g., Lehman Brothers, 
Washington Mutual), (were) merged with other financial institutions to survive (e.g., Merrill 
Lynch) or received help from the government (e.g., AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Commerzbank, 
ABN AMRO). Most banks and insurance companies were forced to decrease the share of their 
investments in risky assets such as VC funds. Another argument concerns the exit channels for VC 
investments, which are IPOs, acquisitions, secondary sales, buybacks, and write-offs (Cumming 
and MacIntosh, 2003). Since the crisis had also affected the market for IPOs, VC firms faced severe 
exit challenges, which in turn also reduced the supply of money for VC funds.1 Black and Gilson 
(1998), for example, argue that the amount of funds raised depends on a vibrant market for IPOs. 
Decrease in the valuation of VC-backed start-ups: The crisis has clearly led to one of the 
deepest recessions in recent years. The US GDP decreased by 5.4% in the fourth quarter 2008 from 
the previous quarter (Q1 2009: -4.6%; Q2 2009: -0.8%).2 The German economy (the largest Euro-
pean economy) decreased by 1.8% in the fourth quarter (Q1 2009: -3.4%; Q2 2009: +0.8%).3 In 
times of recession, VC-backed start-ups have problems generating sufficient revenues. End con-
sumers and firms have less money to spend and may postpone purchases. This puts pressure on the 
start-ups’ sales and leads to lower firm valuations. In addition, the start-ups’ bankruptcy risks 
increase, and VC firms apply higher discount rates. To summarize, the recession followed by the 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
1
  See Ritter (2009) for detailed information about the market for IPOs in 2008 and 2009. 
2
  See http://www.bea.gov (accessed January 9th, 2010). 
3
  See http://www.destatis.de (accessed January 9th, 2010). 
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crisis has led to lower valuations of VC-seeking start-ups, which also correspond to declines in 
stock prices on public equity markets. 
 
IV. Empirical study 
A. Measures and data 
This section analyzes the effect of the crisis on VC activity across different industries and 
countries (US vs. non-US). The funding round will be our unit of analysis (i.e., the financing round 
in which start-ups raise money from one or multiple VC investors). We focus on two measures: (1) 
the number of funding rounds per month; (2) the amount of funds raised per funding round. Both 
measures will be calculated for the periods before and during the crisis. 
Our data originates from the Thomson VentureXpert database (formerly known as Venture 
Economics), which has been widely used in the entrepreneurial financing literature (Bygrave, 1989; 
Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Gompers and Lerner, 2004; Hochberg et al., 2007). This decision 
contrasts with those of Block and Sandner (2009), who used the database CrunchBase as a novel 
dataset.4 Compared to CrunchBase, VentureXpert goes further back in time and is thus the largest 
available database on private equity and VC investments. It is updated on a daily basis using mainly 
public sources to gather its information (Gompers and Lerner, 2004). 
 
B. The VC market over the last two decades and the effect of the crisis 
Figure 1 shows the number of annual funding rounds from 1987 to 2009. During the second 
half of the 1990s, the VC market began to grow strongly. Favorable conditions in the IPO market 
and the exits of less experienced VCs encouraged investors to allocate money toward VC funds 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2001). This increase steepened during the late 1990s as internet start-ups 
became favorable investment targets. The bursting of the internet bubble in the year 2000 led to a 
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  See http://www.crunchbase.com (accessed January 11th, 2010). 
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strong decrease in the number of funding rounds, bringing the annual number of funding rounds 
back to the level of 1999. During the aftermath of the dot-com crash, venture capitalists remained 
active at a level of about 7,800 rounds per year. The effect of the crisis becomes visible during the 
final year of our sample, where the number of rounds decreased to about 3,800 for the year up until 
September 2009 (corresponding to an annual number of funding rounds of about 5,100). The effect 
of the 2008 crisis is thus sizeable and comparable to that of the dot-com crash in the year 2000. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
C. The VC market immediately before and during the crisis 
Figure 2 shows the number of funding rounds from July 2007 to September 2009 on a quar-
terly basis. A downward slope is visible starting from the third quarter in 2008, departing from 
2,157 funding rounds and leveling off at 1,246 in the first quarter of 2009 (i.e., a decrease of 42%). 
When looking at this period on a monthly basis (see Figure 3), we see that the VC market is rather 
fluctuant in its activity, making it difficult to determine the exact date the crisis started to have an 
effect on VC activity. The impact of the crisis somewhat stabilizes from January 2009 onwards, 
around a level of 400 funding rounds per month. 
 
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 here] 
 
To determine the date from which the crisis began to have an effect on VC activity, we need 
to take seasonal fluctuations into account. For example, throughout the five years preceding the 
crisis, the highest number of funding rounds always occurred in December and June, in contrast to 
the months of January and February, which often report the lowest amount of VC activity. Taking 
seasonal influences into account, Figure 4 compares the number of funding rounds for each month 
to the same time period in the previous year. This measure can be compared to the common meas-
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ure of GDP growth, which is also not an absolute but a relative measure but compares the GDP of 
the current year with the GDP of the previous year. First, we see that the VC market was growing 
until April 2008. The turning point occurs in May 2008, when the VC volume began to decline. The 
VC market was thus already in decline when the crisis became monumentally publicly visible in 
September 2008 through the crash of Lehman Brothers. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
D. The effect of the crisis on VC activity across different industries 
To measure the impact of the crisis, it is necessary to choose a date that determines the pre-
crisis period and the crisis period. Many events associated with the crisis occurred in September 
2008, when many financial institutions became visibly affected by the crisis. Among others, the 
investment bank Lehman Brothers went bankrupt on September 15, 2008. A sharp decline in stock 
prices followed in the beginning of October. However, from our analyses above, we can see that the 
VC market was already declining when the crisis became visible in September 2008. Accordingly, 
for our analyses regarding the effect of the crisis across industries, we choose two different cutoff 
points to determine the crisis and pre-crisis periods: (1) September 15, 2008, the date Lehman 
Brothers went bankrupt, and (2) July 1, 2008. During July 2008, the commodity futures had already 
had their peak, and a shift toward US treasuries and gold started (Orlowsky, 2008). 
To analyze whether the amount of funds raised per funding round changed due to the crisis, 
we calculated the median amount of funds raised per funding round before and during the crisis. We 
then used a Wilcoxon rank-sum test to find out whether the differences are statistically significant. 
To avoid becoming unduly technical, we limit ourselves to this (rather simple) univariate analysis. 
Using multivariate regressions, Block and Sandner (2009) have shown that controlling for factors 
such as the presence of an investment consortium, the age of the funded company, or the type of 
VC investor (business angel or VC fund) did not change the results substantially. 
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Table 1 shows the effect of the financial crisis across different industries. We analyze the pe-
riod from January 2007 to September 2009 and use July 1, 2008, as a cutoff date to determine the 
crisis and pre-crisis periods. During that period, 14,355 funding rounds occurred. We distinguish 
between the effects of the crisis regarding the first and later funding rounds, a distinction which has 
been shown to make a great difference (Block and Sandner, 2009). In initial funding rounds, the 
funds raised provide initial money to start-ups. Second and later rounds equip start-up firms with 
additional funds so that they can continue with their development, marketing, or internationalization 
efforts. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 reports a drop in the number of funding rounds per month during the crisis. This de-
crease occurs within all industries and is larger for first rounds (-33.3%) than for later rounds 
(-17.7%). Especially in Biotechnology (-29.4%), Internet (-39.7%), and Medical/Health Care 
(-40.0%), we observe that VCs were more reluctant to provide first-round investments toward ‘new’ 
start-ups during the crisis than during the pre-crisis period. Within these industries, the percentage 
decrease in first-round investments is about four times larger than the decrease in later-round 
investments. 
Table 1 also shows the median amount of funds raised per funding round. Using the median as 
an indicator robust to extreme values, a decrease is visible in the amount of funds raised during the 
crisis, especially within later funding rounds. The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show that start-ups raise 
significantly lower funds within later funding rounds in Internet, Medical/Health Care, and Com-
puter Software and Service. A significant decrease in the amount raised in first-round investments 
can only be observed in Biotechnology. 
In summary, during the crisis, VC activity slowed down. The crisis affected the number of 
first-round investments to a greater extent than the number of second- and later-round investments. 
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Second, the amount of funds raised in each funding round decreased to a greater degree in later 
funding rounds than in first rounds. 
Table 2 uses the crash of Lehman Brothers on September 15th 2008 as a cutoff date to deter-
mine the crisis and pre-crisis periods. Across all industries, the decrease in the number of funding 
rounds is stronger than in Table 1, where July 1, 2008, is used as a cutoff point. This is in line with 
our expectations, as Figures 3 and 4 have already indicated that the number of funding rounds 
declined strongly during the months after September 2008. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The findings regarding the amount of funds raised per funding round also became more pro-
nounced. For example, in addition to the later funding round decreases in Internet, Medical/Health 
Care, and Computer Software and Services, we now also observe a decrease in the amount of funds 
in Communications and Media and Other Products. 
 
E. The effect of the crisis on VC activity: US vs. non-US  
Although the crisis started in the US, it became a global phenomenon. Through trade and 
capital flows, the crisis spread from the US to other countries (Alumnia et al., 2009). Some coun-
tries outside the US experienced even larger drops in manufacturing production, exports, and equity 
prices. In Europe, the Baltic countries and the Republic of Iceland in particular were hit extremely 
hard, leading these countries toward a state of near-insolvency. Different countries have responded 
differently to the crisis, notably with varying monetary and fiscal policies. For these reasons, we 
expect the effects of the crisis on VC to differ across countries. Due to the limited number of VC 
deals outside the US (in our dataset), we focus on a US versus non-US comparison. Although it 
would be preferable to look at the effects of the crisis in different countries in greater detail, we 
defer this question to future inquiry. 
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Tables 3 and 4 compare the consequences of the crisis for start-ups located in the US to the 
consequences for those outside the US. Table 3 defines the beginning of the crisis as July 1, 2008. It 
shows that the decrease in the number of funding rounds per month is stronger within the US than 
outside the US. This difference is particularly strong for first-round investments (−42% in the US 
vs. −19% outside the US). The reductions in VC activity reported in Table 4, taking September 16, 
2008, as the cutoff date, are similar. It seems that the VC market in the US has been more strongly 
affected by the financial crisis than the VC market outside the US. This finding is also supported by 
our second measure. The decrease in the amount of funds raised per funding round is significant for 
the VC market in the US but insignificant for the VC market outside the US. 
 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here] 
 
V. Summary of main findings and discussion 
A. Summary of main findings  
The main findings from our empirical study in Section IV are as follows: 
• The crisis led to a decrease in the number of funding rounds. This decrease was gener-
ally stronger for the first funding round than for later funding rounds. The effect could 
be observed across all industries. It was highest in Internet (−46%) and lowest in In-
dustrial/Energy (−18%). 
• The amount of funds raised per funding round decreased. This decrease was generally 
stronger for later than for first funding rounds. In addition, the decrease in the amount 
of funds raised per funding round differed across industries. Significant decreases 
could be observed in Internet, Medical/Health Care, Computer Software and Services, 
Computer Hardware, Communications and Media, and Other products. The crisis did 
not show a statistically significant effect in Biotechnology, Consumer-related, Indus-
trial/Energy, Other Products, and Semiconductors/Other Electronics. 
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• Finally, the slowdown of VC activity due to the crisis has been more severe in the US 
than outside the US. This applies to both the number of funding rounds and the amount 
of funds raised in each funding round. 
 
B. Discussion of the results 
Our results show that the crisis strongly impacted the VC market: the market is down in 
both the number of investment dollars and the number of deals (see Tables 1 and 2). Interestingly, 
this effect differed with regard to the stage of financing. The decrease in the number of deals can 
primarily be observed in first funding rounds, whereas the decrease in the number of investment 
dollars occurred in later funding rounds. How can these results be explained? The lower number of 
deals in the first founding round is most likely due to stricter investment criteria by VC firms. 
compared to the period before the crisis, the VC firms have less money to invest, are more critical 
about their VC investments, and tend to postpone their investments. Not surprisingly, they are less 
willing to take risks than they were before the crisis. Accordingly, start-ups that still receive VC 
funding are at later development stages and are, ceteris paribus, thus associated with lower risks 
(i.e., they might already have developed a prototype or established first customer contacts). Addi-
tionally, these entrepreneurs are in a different situation than they were before the crisis. If possible, 
they postpone their costly development and internationalization plans until the capital markets 
stabilize. Some entrepreneurs might even refrain from starting a company at all because they do not 
expect to obtain adequate financing. Entrepreneurs at early-stage companies might also consider 
alternative employment options. The situation is different for later-stage start-ups. These start-ups 
find themselves in a dilemma. Despite the lower valuations and the declining VC market, they still 
need later-stage funding to survive. In turn, the VC investors face the choice of either partly writing 
off their past investments or committing to providing fresh money in subsequent rounds of financ-
ing. Most likely, the VC investors will commit to new rounds of financing, but they are prone to 
lower the amount of funds they invest. These start-ups are in a weak negotiation position vis-à-vis 
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the VC firm(s). They need the VC capital to survive. In a nutshell, later-stage ventures find them-
selves in a kind of ‘lock-in situation’ and cannot avoid the lower valuation of their firm by VCs. 
Early-stage start-ups have more alternatives (including to not start the venture) and thus appear to 
be in a more comfortable and flexible position. 
An alternative explanation for the drop in investment dollars is the following: an important 
difference between early- and later-stage ventures is associated with the unhealthy state of the IPO 
market. VC firms do not provide ‘patient’ capital. Instead, they intend to sell the firm in which they 
have invested after a few years. Conducting an IPO in a recession is not an attractive option. 
Following this logic, firms at later stages of the venture cycle become less attractive as investment 
targets, especially because the prospects of a revival of the IPO market in the short term are poor. 
Cumming et al. (2005) show that when exit markets are illiquid, VC investors invest proportionally 
more in early-stage projects. In turn, when exit markets are liquid, VCs invest more in later-stage 
ventures. Another explanation not related to valuation issues concerns the process of staging itself. 
The crisis and the greater uncertainty about the prospects for the economy might have increased the 
tendency of VCs to stage their investments. This tendency should be stronger with start-ups in later 
stages of the venture cycle, as the money at stake for the VCs is larger. 
Our empirical study also shows that the crisis had a stronger effect on the VC market in the 
US than elsewhere. From a theoretical standpoint, this seems surprising. In a world of efficient 
financial markets (Fama, 1970), there should not exist any differences. VC money is not bound to 
borders and can flow to wherever the best start-ups are located. If the crisis led to an external shock 
in the supply of VC money, the effect on the amount of deals and investment dollars should be 
similar in every country. The fact that the effect of the crisis seems to differ across countries shows 
market imperfections, which can be explained by irrational economic behavior and psychological 
pitfalls (e.g., Akerlof and Shiller, 2009; Klodt, 2009). Examples of such behavior are the tendency 
to overestimate our own skills (Thaler, 2000), the tendency to pay less attention to information 
questioning our decisions than to information supporting our decisions (Brehm, 1956), and the 
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endowment effect (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979; Knetsch, 1989). These types of irrational 
behavior may exist in both the VC market and the financial market in general. Our results suggest 
that imperfections in the VC market were greater in the US than in other countries. Accordingly, the 
effects of the crisis should also be greater in the US. 
 
VI. Implications and further research 
A.  Implications 
The implications of our findings can be grouped into (1) implications for start-ups seeking 
VC funding and (2) implications for the evolution of innovative industries and technological 
development: 
• Implications for start-ups: Our results show that start-ups that sought VC were af-
fected by the crisis. Start-ups that had already received initial funding and wanted (or 
needed) to raise further funds faced a discount as a result of the crisis (the extent of 
this discount varied between industries and countries; see Tables 1 to 4). This discount 
was most likely a result of valuation changes by VC investors. One lesson of this crisis 
is that start-ups seeking later-stage financing should try to foresee such developments 
and adapt their business planning accordingly. Cutting costs or postponing expansion 
plans may be adequate reactions. In times of a financial and/or economic crisis, they 
will encounter difficulties in raising the funds required to further finance their product 
development, marketing, and internationalization efforts. Our results also show that the 
crisis led to a drop in the number of initial funding rounds. We suggest that VC firms 
became more selective as a reaction to the financial crisis. Or, in other words: start-ups 
that sought VC during the crisis had to fulfill stricter criteria during the crisis than be-
fore it. Entrepreneurs that seek initial funding should keep this in mind and think about 
alternative sources of funds, such as angel investors or bank loans (Cassar, 2004; Har-
rison and Mason, 2000). If there exist no alternatives to VC money (as is often the 
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case), entrepreneurs might consider changing the way they communicate to potential 
VC funders, e.g., they might adjust their business plans and stress that the chances of 
success of their particular start-up are rather immune to the development of a crisis. 
They might also consider playing down some risks associated with their start-up. An 
alternative strategy would be to look for some sort of bridge financing from sources 
other than VC money. Finally, our results show that the effect of the crisis on VC ac-
tivity differed across industries and countries. Industry differences can be explained by 
the varying potential of business models in different areas; country differences can be 
explained by market imperfections caused by different degrees of irrational economic 
behavior and psychological pitfalls (Akerloff and Shiller, 2009; Klodt, 2009). Start-
ups seeking VC should be aware of these imperfections in their business planning. 
• Implications for the evolution of innovative industries and technological develop-
ment: VC is an important means of funding for start-ups in innovative and technology-
driven industries because it is the vehicle used to turn innovative ideas into products 
that can be sold to customers (Jell, Block, and Henkel, 2009; Zider, 1998). VC particu-
larly matters when firms conduct R&D and start to commercialize their innovations, 
that is, when they develop their products, apply for patents, look for distribution part-
ners, seek initial customers, conduct their internationalization strategies, or simply 
scale up their operations (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Zider, 1998). VC firms not only 
provide financial means but also offer non-financial benefits such as management sup-
port and access to experts or existing business networks (Large and Muegge, 2008; 
Schefczyk and Gerpott, 2001). Florida and Kenney (1988, p. 119) see VC firms as 
“technological gatekeepers accelerating the process of technological change.” Thus, 
the VC market drying up can have long-lasting negative effects with regard to the evo-
lution of innovative industries (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001; Bottazzi et al., 2002; Kor-
tum and Lerner, 2000). Innovative start-ups might face illiquidity, and the speed of 
  
16 
commercialization of technological innovations might slow down. Ultimately, a coun-
try’s or an industry’s path of evolution can be adversely affected. Governments should 
be aware of these negative side-effects of the financial crisis, as they might determine 
their country’s innovative capacity. Therefore, far, the policy responses to the crisis 
have been designed to avoid a credit crunch (Gern and Janssen, 2009; Sinn, 2009), that 
is, to avoid a collapse of the credit market for small and large firms. Our results re-
garding the effect of the crisis on the VC market suggest that this may not be enough: 
many innovative firms do not rely on debt but rather on VC as a source of financing. 
Avoiding a credit crunch helps established (small and large) firms in established indus-
tries rather than start-ups in innovative industries. 
B. Further research 
This is one of the first studies to empirically document and analyze the effects of a financial 
crisis on VC activity (Block and Sandner, 2009). VC has become an element vital to the current 
economy and an important source of funding for innovative start-ups (Gompers, 1994; Jell, Block, 
and Henkel, 2009). In this study, we show that a financial crisis can have a strong, exogenous 
impact on VC activity. Unlike the last slowdown of VC activities following the collapse of the New 
Economy bubble in the year 2000, the 2008 slowdown came more as an exogenous shock to the VC 
market. In the 2007-2009 crisis, what initiated the downturn of VC activity were not unrealistic 
expectations regarding the “omnipotence” of the Internet and the New Economy but instead prob-
lems in the financial sector. We suggest that such an exogenous shock can lead to a severe funding 
gap in the financing of innovation. 
A number of questions are left unanswered and provide good opportunities for future re-
search. How do start-ups receiving funding during the crisis differ from start-ups that received 
funding before the crisis? For example, are the former more successful, were they associated with 
lower bankruptcy risks, or did they simply communicate in a better way? How did the start-up 
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entrepreneurs react to the challenges of the crisis and the difficulties in the search for VC funding?5 
For example, did they look for alternative sources of funding such as money from business angels, 
or did they postpone their expansion plans? Have the fiscal stimulus packages of the US and other 
governments had any effect on the VC market?6 What is the effect of the crisis on the performance 
of VC funds? Why has the impact on the clean-tech industry been weak compared to impacts on 
other industries? And ultimately, over a longer time period, did the decrease of VC activity due to 
financial markets have severe consequences for the real economy? For example, did the number of 
innovations slow down? 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
5
  See Koellinger and Thurik (2009) for a discussion of entrepreneurship and the business cycle. 
6
  See Van Roye and Wesselbaum (2009) for a study of the effect of the fiscal stimulus packages. 
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Table 1: The effect of the financial crisis on VC activity across industries (cut-off point: July 1st, 2008) 
  
 Before crisis 
(Jan 2007 to June 2008) 
During crisis  
(July 2008 to Sept 2009) 
 
Change in … 
 
Industry  
 
 
Stage of 
funding 
round  N 
Ø rounds/ 
month 
Funds 
raised/ 
round 
(median)  N 
Ø rounds/ 
month 
funds 
raised/ 
round 
(median) 
 …Ø rounds/ 
    month 
…funds raised/ round 
 
    Wilcoxon 
    rank-sum test 
    (Z-value) 
Biotechnology  First rounds  226 12.6 4.2  133 8.9 2.8  -29.4%  2.39 * 
  Later rounds  569 31.6 6.0  452 30.1 5.0  -4.7%  1.31 
Communications and Media  First rounds  163 9.1 4.5  88 5.9 3.9  -35.2%  0.31 
  Later rounds  493 27.4 5.0  274 18.3 4.5  -33.3%  1.72 
Computer Hardware  First rounds  102 5.7 4.0  64 4.3 4.0  -24.7%  0.87 
 
 Later rounds  203 11.3 3.7  148 9.9 4.1  -12.5%  -0.66 
Computer Software and Services  First rounds  456 25.3 3.0  269 17.9 2.3  -29.2%  0.71 
 
 Later rounds  1,100 61.1 3.6  689 45.9 3.0  -24.8%  2.04 * 
Consumer related  First rounds  243 13.5 3.6  126 8.4 3.4  -37.8%  0.14 
 
 Later rounds  225 12.5 3.2  150 10.0 4.0  -20.0%  -1.05 
Industrial/Energy  First rounds  320 17.8 5.0  241 16.1 4.0  -9.6%  1.23 
 
 Later rounds  324 18.0 6.7  272 18.1 5.6  0.7%  1.10 
Internet  First rounds  705 39.2 3.1  354 23.6 3.0  -39.7%  1.21 
 
 Later rounds  961 53.4 5.0  715 47.7 4.0  -10.7%  3.12 ** 
Medical/Health Care  First rounds  384 21.3 3.9  192 12.8 3.0  -40.0%  1.20 
 
 Later rounds  783 43.5 5.0  567 37.8 4.5  -13.1%  1.98 * 
Other Products  First rounds  528 29.3 5.0  266 17.7 5.1  -39.5%  0.10 
 
 Later rounds  341 18.9 5.0  204 13.6 3.0  -28.2%  1.85 
Semiconductors/Other Electronics  First rounds  158 8.8 2.6  93 6.2 2.8  -29.4%  1.03 
 
 Later rounds  485 26.9 5.3  289 19.3 4.5  -28.5%  1.05 
Total sample  First rounds  3,285 182.5 3.9  1,826 121.7 3.2  -33.3%  2.62 ** 
 
 Later rounds  5,484 304.7 4.8  3,760 250.7 4.0  -17.7%  4.13 ** 
Notes: * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; two-sided tests employed;     Data source: VentureXpert (accessed November 11th, 2009); includes both US and non-US funded ventures. 
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Table 2: The effect of the financial crisis on VC activity across industries (cut-off point: Sept 16th, 2008) 
  
 Before crisis 
(Jan 2007 to Sept 15th 2008) 
During crisis  
(Sept 16th 2008 to Sept 2009) 
 
Change in … 
 
Industry  
 
 
Stage of 
funding 
round  N 
Ø rounds/ 
month 
Funds 
raised/ 
round 
(median)  N 
Ø rounds/ 
month 
funds 
raised/ 
round 
(median) 
 …Ø rounds/ 
    month 
…funds raised/ round 
 
    Wilcoxon 
    rank-sum test 
    (Z-value) 
Biotechnology  First rounds  256 12.5 4.1  103 8.2 2.8  -34.0%   1.80 
  Later rounds  652 31.8 6.0  369 29.5 5.1  -7.2%   1.11 
Communications and Media  First rounds  179 8.7 4.5  72 5.8 3.9  -34.0%   0.45 
  Later rounds  559 27.3 5.0  208 16.6 4.1  -39.0%   2.05  * 
Computer Hardware  First rounds  113 5.5 4.5  53 4.2 2.1  -23.1%   2.62  ** 
  Later rounds  233 11.4 3.7  118 9.4 4.2  -16.9%   -0.75 
Computer Software and Services  First rounds  517 25.2 3.0  208 16.6 2.5  -34.0%   0.61 
  Later rounds  1,239 60.4 3.7  550 44.0 3.0  -27.2%   3.12  ** 
Consumer related  First rounds  274 13.4 3.6  95 7.6 3.3  -43.1%   0.20 
  Later rounds  261 12.7 3.5  114 9.1 3.3  -28.4%   -0.63 
Industrial/Energy  First rounds  375 18.3 5.0  186 14.9 4.0  -18.7%   1.15 
  Later rounds  388 18.9 6.5  208 16.6 5.3  -12.1%   1.06 
Internet   First rounds  797 38.9 3.0  262 21.0 3.0  -46.1%   0.92 
  Later rounds  1,117 54.5 4.8  559 44.7 4.0  -17.9%   2.88  ** 
Medical/Health Care  First rounds  429 20.9 3.7  147 11.8 2.9  -43.8%   1.38 
  Later rounds  902 44.0 5.0  448 35.8 4.4  -18.5%   2.27  * 
Other Products  First rounds  588 28.7 5.0  206 16.5 5.2  -42.5%   -0.03 
  Later rounds  391 19.1 5.0  154 12.3 2.8  -35.4%   2.44  * 
Semiconductors/Other electronics  First rounds  178 8.7 2.6  73 5.8 2.5  -32.7%   0.83 
  Later rounds  545 26.6 5.0  229 18.3 4.4  -31.1%   1.21 
Total sample  First rounds  3,706 180.8 3.7  1,405 112.4 3.2  -37.8%   2.62  ** 
  Later rounds  6,287 306.7 4.8  2,957 236.6 4.0  -22.9%   4.93  ** 
Notes: * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; two-sided tests employed;     Data source: VentureXpert (accessed November 11th, 2009); includes both US and non-US funded ventures. 
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Table 3: The effect of the financial crisis on VC activity: US vs. non-US (cut-off point: July 1st, 2008) 
 
 Before crisis 
(Jan 2007 to June 2008) 
During crisis  
(July 2008 to Sept 2009) 
 
Change in … 
 
Country 
 
 
Stage of 
funding 
round  N 
Ø rounds 
p. month Median  N 
Ø rounds 
p. month Median  
…Ø rounds/ 
    month 
…funds raised/ round 
 
    Wilcoxon 
    rank-sum test 
    (Z-value) 
Funded venture located in US First rounds  2,049 113.8 3.3  991 66.1 2.7  -42.0%  3.17  ** 
 Later rounds  4,567 253.7 4.7  3,090 206.0 4.0  -18.8%  5.03  ** 
Funded venture located outside US First rounds  1,236 68.7 4.6  835 55.7 4.0  -18.9%  1.52 
 
Later rounds  917 50.9 5.0  670 44.7 5.1  -12.3%  -0.72 
Total sample   8,769    5,586      
Notes: * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; two-sided tests employed;     Data source: VentureXpert (accessed November 11th, 2009); all industries are included. 
 
 
Table 4: The effect of the financial crisis on VC activity: US vs. non-US (cut-off point: Sept 16th, 2008) 
 
 Before crisis 
(Jan 2007 to Sept 15th 2008) 
During crisis  
(Sept 16th 2008 to Sept 2009) 
 
Change in … 
 
Country 
 
 
Stage of 
funding 
round  N 
Ø rounds 
p. month Median  N 
Ø rounds 
p. month Median  
…Ø rounds/ 
    month 
…funds raised/ round 
 
    Wilcoxon 
    rank-sum test 
    (Z-value) 
Funded venture located in US First rounds  2,286 111.5 3.2  754 60.3 2.6  -45.9%  2.90 ** 
 Later rounds  5,225 254.9 4.6  2,432 194.6 3.7  -23.7%  5.50 ** 
Funded venture located outside US First rounds  1,420 69.3 4.6  651 52.1 3.9  -24.8%  1.80 
 Later rounds  1,062 51.8 5.1  525 42.0 5.0  -18.9%  0.12 
Total sample   9,993    4,362      
Notes: * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; two-sided tests employed;     Data source: VentureXpert (accessed November 11th, 2009); all industries are included. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Number of funding rounds (from Jan. 1987 to Sept. 2009) 
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Source: VentureXpert (accessed November 11th, 2009); all industries and countries are included. 
Note: *) The year 2009 only includes the months from January to September. The dotted line indicates 
the number of funding rounds proportionally scaled to the whole year (3,817 / 3 * 4 = 5,090) 
 
Figure 2: Number of funding rounds (quarterly basis, from Q1 2006 to Q3 2009) 
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Source: VentureXpert (accessed November 11th, 2009); all industries and countries are included. 
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Figure 3: Number of funding rounds (monthly basis, from Jan 2007 to Sept 2009) 
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Source: VentureXpert (accessed November 11th, 2009); all industries and countries are included. 
 
Figure 4: Change in the number of funding rounds (compared with previous year) 
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Source: VentureXpert (accessed November 11th, 2009); all industries and countries are included. 
